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**T. PARSONS**. **About the concept of "political power"**

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Power is understood here as an intermediary, identical to money, which circulates within what we call the political system, but goes far beyond the latter and penetrates into­the three functional subsystems of society (as I imagine them) —­the economic subsystem, the subsystem of integration, and the subsystem­of maintaining cultural patterns. By using a very brief description of the Properties of money as an economic instrument­of this type, we can better understand the specifics of the properties of power.

Money, as the classics of economics argued­, is both a medium of exchange and a "value standard"at the same time. Money is a symbol in the sense that while it measures and therefore "expresses" economic value or utility,­it is not itself a utility in the original consumer sense of the word. Money does not have a "consumer value", but only an "exchange value", i.e. it allows you to purchase useful things. Money is used, therefore, to exchange offers to sell or, conversely, to buy useful things. Money becomes the main intermediary only when the exchange is not obligatory, like the exchange of gifts between certain categories of relatives, or when it is not carried out on the basis of barter, i.e. the exchange of equivalent things and services.

By making up for the lack of direct benefit from itself, money gives the recipient four important degrees of freedom to­participate in the system of universal exchanges:

1) the freedom to spend the money received on the purchase of any item or set of items from among those available on the market and within the limits of available funds;

2) the freedom to choose between many variants of the desired thing;

3) the freedom to choose the most appropriate time to buy;

4) the freedom to consider the terms of the purchase, which, by virtue of the freedom to choose the time and option of the offer, a person can, depending on the­circumstances, accept or reject. In contrast, in the case of­a barter, the bidder is bound by what his partner has or wants to have in exchange for what he had, and will concede at the moment. Along with­obtaining the four degrees of freedom, a person is, of course, exposed to the risk associated with the hypothetical assumption that money will be accepted by others and that its value will remain unchanged.

The first money was an intermediary that was still very close to­the market — the most famous example of this is precious metals­, and many still believe that the value of money­is "really" based on the market value of its metal base­. On this basis, however, a complex structure of credit instruments has been built in developed financial systems, in which only a small part of transactions have actually­been made using metal money — they are turned into a "reserve",­reserved just in case, and are used mainly for settling international balance sheets. I will discuss the­loan method in more detail in another part of the article. For now, suffice it to say that, no matter how important the availability of metal reserves­may be in some cases, all modern financial systems­function primarily not on metal as a real intermediary, but on money "without value". Moreover, the "no-cost" acceptance of this money­is based on a certain trust institutionalized in the financial system. If the guarantee of monetary obligations rested only on their convertibility into a metal coin, then in the vast majority of cases they would be devalued for the simple reason that the total amount of metal can cover only a small fraction of the money.

Finally, money is "good", i.e. it functions as an intermediary only in the depths of a sufficiently well-defined network of market relations, which has indeed reached the world level today, but­the maintenance of which requires special measures to ensure the mutual convertibility­of national currencies. Such a system is an area of virtual­exchanges in which money can be spent, but not in the depths of which certain conditions are maintained that provide the system with protection and management by both the law and the responsible­authorities controlled by the law.

Similarly, the concept of an institutionalized system of government primarily highlights the system of relations in which certain types of promises and obligations imposed or assumed voluntarily — for example, in accordance with a contract — are considered to be *enforceable,* i.e., in legally­established conditions, authorized persons can demand their fulfillment. In addition, in all established cases of refusal or­refusal to obey, by which the actor­tries to evade his obligations, they will be "forced to respect", threatening him with the real­application of situational-negative sanctions, which in one case perform the function of intimidation, in the other — punishment. It is the events in the case of the person in question that intentionally change (or threaten to change) the situation to his detriment, whatever­the specific content of these changes.

Power, therefore, is the realization of a generalized­ability to force collective members­to fulfill their obligations, legitimized­by their importance to the goals of the collective, and allowing for the possibility of forcing the recalcitrant through the application of negative sanctions to them, whoever the actors in this operation may be.

The reader has noticed that I have used the terms "generalization" and "legitimation"to define power. To gain possession of a useful object by­exchanging it for another item does not mean making a monetary­transaction. In the same way, it follows from my definition that to­achieve the satisfaction of one's desire, whether defined as an obligation­of the object or not, by means of a simple threat from a superior force, does not constitute an act of domination. I am well aware that most representatives of political science would choose a different definition and would see here an example of power [ ... ], but I intend to stick to my own definition and study the consequences that follow from it. The power to secure the gratification of desire must be generalized so that it can be called power in the sense that I attach to this term, and not only be a function of the individual application of a sanction that a single person can impose, and finally, the intermediary used must be "symbolic­". In the second place among the properties of power, I put­legitimacy. This necessarily follows from my understanding of power as "symbolic", which, when exchanged for something really­significant for the effectiveness of the community, namely, obedience­, does not leave the acquirer of benefits, i.e., the person who fulfilled the obligation, "no tangible value". This means that it has nothing else to do but a set of expectations, namely, under different conditions and in different cases, it can recall­certain obligations on the part of other communities. In power systems, legitimation is thus a factor analogous­to trust in mutual consent to the adoption of a monetary unit and its­stability in financial systems.

Both criteria are united by the fact that if the legitimacy of the possession and use of power is questioned, it leads to­the use of increasingly powerful means to achieve­reproach. These tools should be more and more effective­"internally" and, therefore, better adapted to specific situations, based on their insufficiently general nature. Moreover, to the extent that these means are intrinsically­effective, legitimacy gradually becomes less important as a factor in their effectiveness; at the end of this development is­the use, first of various types of coercion, then of force as the most­inherently effective of all means of coercion.

[ ... ] We are now in a position to address the last of the important­problems that we decided to address in this paper,­which is to find out whether power­is a zero-sum problem in the sense that in the system, every increment of power by a unit A is an effective cause of the loss of the corresponding amount of power with other units — B, C, D...­A comparison with money, which we insisted on from the very beginning, could help in finding an answer that is clearly valid under some circumstances­, but in no case will it be so under any circumstances­.

The case of money is clear: when developing a budget designed­to allocate the available income, any allocation of funds for any one item should be made at the expense of other items. The question is whether such restrictions apply in­an economy understood as a global system. For a long time, many economists thought so; and this was the most serious flaw­in the old "quantitative theory of money." The most obvious­political analogy here is the distribution of power within­a separate community. It is quite obvious that if A, who previously occupied a position associated with real power, is moved to a lower rank and B is now in his place, then A loses power, and B gains it, and the total amount of power in the system remains­unchanged. Many theorists, including G. Lasswell and Ch. Wright Mills believed that this rule is equally valid for the entire set of political systems.

The most obvious and serious fact that broke the zero-sum theory was the establishment of credit by commercial banks. This case is so important as a demonstration model that­it requires a brief explanation. When depositors deposit their money in a bank, they not only put it in a safe place, but also put it at the disposal of the bank, which can lend it. By doing so, depositors do­not in any way lose ownership of their money. Deposits are returned *in full at the request of the depositor,* and the only generally accepted restrictions here are determined by the bank's operating mode. The bank still uses part of the deposits to provide an interest-bearing loan, which means that it not only­puts a certain amount of money at the disposal of the borrower, but also assumes in most cases the obligation to demand repayment of the loan only in full compliance with the concluded agreement, which generally­allows the borrower freedom of action, which is not violated in­any way or obliges it to make pre-agreed payments due to amortization of the loan. In other words, the same money begins to perform a "double function": it is considered­as property by both depositors who keep deposit documents and the banker who has received the right to borrow this money as "their own". Thus, there is an increase in the amount of money in circulation, measured by the number of current loans in relation to the volume of perpetual deposits.

[ ... ] In the same way, we will now try to conduct an accurate analysis of the systems of power. My assumption is that there is a circular movement between the political sphere and the economy; its essence is the exchange of a factor of political efficiency — in this case, participation in controlling the productivity of the economy — for an economic result consisting of control over resources, which can, for example, take the form of an investment loan. This circular movement is regulated through power in the sense that the factor represented by the obligations to be fulfilled, in particular the obligation to provide services, more than balances the result represented by the opportunities that have opened up for effective action.

My assumption is that one of the conditions for the stability of this circulation system is the balance of factors and results of power on both sides. This is another way of saying that this condition of stability in terms of power is ideally formulated as a zero-sum system, although the same is not true, due to the investment process, for the funds involved in the turnover. The system of circular circulation inherent in the political sphere is then understood as a place of habitual mobilization of expectations for their fulfillment; this mobilization can be carried out in two ways: either we recall the circumstances that arise from previous agreements, which in some cases, as in the question of citizenship, are legally binding; or we assume, within the established limits, new ones. obligations that replace old ones that have already been fulfilled. Equilibrium characterizes, of course, the whole system, and not individual parts. [...]

Is there a political equivalent of the banking system, a means that would break through the circular circulation of power, allowing significant additions to the amount of power that is held in the system? The point of my argument is to prove that such a tool exists and that its source is located in the support system, i.e. in the zone of exchanges between power and influence on it,  between the political system and the integration system.

First of all, I suggest, and this is especially clear in the case of democratic electoral systems, that political support should be considered as *a generalized* concession to power, which, in the event of an election victory, puts the elected leaders in a position similar to that of a banker. Government "deposits" made­by voters can be withdrawn — if not immediately, then at least at the next election and on a condition similar to the bank's operating mode. In some cases, elections are associated with conditions comparable to barter, more precisely, with the expectation of meeting certain specific requirements advocated by strategic-minded voters, and they alone. But it is especially important that in a system that is pluralistic in terms of not only the composition of the forces providing political support, but also the problems to be solved, such leaders are given free rein to make various binding decisions, affecting other groups of society as well, and not just those whose interests are not directly related to the political situation."interest" was met directly. This freedom can be represented as limited by a circular flow: in other words, we can say that the power factor passing through the channel of political support will be most precisely balanced by its result-political decisions in the interests of those groups that specifically demanded them.

However, there is another component of the freedom of elected leaders that is crucial here. It is the freedom to use influence — for example, through the prestige of a position that does not coincide with the amount of power due to it — to make new attempts to" equalize " power and influence. It is the use of influence to strengthen the overall power supply. How can this be imagined?

It is important that the relationship between the funds used for positive and negative sanctions is an inversion of the case with the creation of a bank loan. There it was really about using the power specified in the mandatory execution of loan agreements, which made it possible to "feel the difference". Here we are talking about the ability to selectively exercise influence through persuasion. This process seems to fulfill its role through a management function that — through relationships maintained with various aspects of the electoral body structure of the community-generates and structures new "demand" in the sense of a specific demand for solutions.

Then we can say that such a demand is applied to those who make decisions. - justifies the growing production of power, which was made possible precisely because of the generalized nature of the mandate of political support; since this mandate was issued not on the basis of barter, i.e. in exchange for specific decisions, but because of the "equation" of power and influence that was established through­elections, it is a means of implementation, within the framework of the constitution, what at the governmental level seems most­in line with the "general interest". In this case, managers can be compared to bankers or "brokers" who can mobilize the commitments of their constituents in such a way that the aggregate of commitments made by the entire community increases. This­approach must still be justified by the mobilization of influence: it must simultaneously be perceived as­conforming to current norms and applicable to situations that "require" action at the level of collective commitments.

The critical problem for justification is, in a certain sense, the problem of consensus, its impact on the value­principle of solidarity. Consequently, consensus becomes the criterion corresponding to this value principle*.*

In this case, the problem arises of finding the basis that allows breaking the circular stability of the zero-sum power system. Crucial to this is that this can happen when the community and its members are ready to take on new, enforceable obligations beyond and beyond those that were previously in force. Then there is an urgent need to justify such an expansion and transform the "feeling" that something needs to be done into an obligation to take effective action, which contains, if necessary, coercive sanctions. In this­process, the strongman is represented by elected leaders — insofar as the analytically independent character of the­position of power inherent in their function applies to them,­defining the leader as a person burdened with finding the necessary­justification for political programs that would not be adopted in the event of a power cycle.

It can be assumed that the comparison with credit, along with others, turns out to be correct from the point of view of its time dimension. The­need for greater efficiency, which is necessary to implement new programs that add to the overall community burden, entails changes at the organizational level through a new combination of production factors, the development of new organisms, the engagement of personnel, the development of new norms, and even the modification of the basis of legitimation. Consequently, elected leaders cannot be held legally responsible for immediate implementation, and, on the contrary, sources of political support must give them confidence, i.e., they must not immediately "pay" — at the time­of the next election — for the share of power that their votes held by decisions­dictated by their own interests.

It may be appropriate to call the responsibility assumed in this case the responsibility of management, emphasizing its difference from administrative responsibility, focused on­everyday functions. In any case, I would like to present the process­of increasing power in a way that is strictly analogous­to economic investment, in the sense that "compensation" should lead to an­increase in the level of collective success in the direction identified above, namely, increasing the effectiveness of collective action in areas with discovered value that no one suspected, if the leader did not take a risk, like an entrepreneur, by­deciding to invest. [...]

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**Thereare eight types of power holders**

1. Bureaucracy - the power of authorized persons over unauthorized persons. Bureaucrats are scolded everywhere and everywhere. But everyone understands perfectly well that it is impossible to live in society without the apparatus of the official people, who concentrate in their hands the maintenance and disposal of the mechanisms of power. But in the appropriate situation, conditions arise for the rebirth of the apparatus, which loses its secondary, providing character and acquires a primary status. Such conditions can include: a) formalism, i.e. following the letter of the instruction in the first place without taking into account real circumstances and vital interests; b) red tape, i.e. delaying any cases either due to insolvency or deliberate extortion; c) treasury, i.e. monitoring work apparently in compliance with the requirements of the law. any absolutely insignificant trifles to the detriment of practical business; d) voluntarism, bribery, usury, corruption.

It is impossible not to refer to S. N. Parkinson when describing bureaucracy and officials (Parkinson S. N., 1989). In particular, he writes that the number of employees and the amount of work are not related to each other. According to Parkinson's law, the number of employees increases regardless of whether the number of cases has decreased, increased or disappeared altogether. And then he gives two axiomatic propositions: 1) the official multiplies subordinates, but not rivals; 2) officials work for each other.

2. Scientocracy - the power of the knowledgeable over the ignorant. As noted above, humanity and man throughout history have to fight for their existence. By nature, a person is practically not adapted to live in a physical environment, is not able to protect himself from the hostile animal world, get food, build high-quality housing. But nature has given him one advantage - to understand the essence of the laws of the surrounding world. Sophisticated adaptability of a person to survive in the world is achieved through powerful compensation mechanisms that adapt the strengths and weaknesses of opponents to achieve their interests. The whole history of human relations with the surrounding reality is a confirmation of the thesis of J. R. R. Tolkien. Lasswell's idea that power is compensation for inferiority. And this provision should not be considered an insult. Compensation for inferiority the desire to achieve the goal through specially organized behavior, using what nature has given to man, and finding new algorithms for actions.

3. Technocracy - the power of the skilled over the incompetent. The influence of technocrats is present in all spheres of political and public life. And often in indirect forms. The power of technocrats and their influence is sometimes not even realized. Let's give an example: the United States created an atomic bomb and tested it, thus proving the superiority of its technocrats and scientocrats over all others. How did this affect the processes that took place in the USSR and the lives of ordinary people? It was influenced in such a way that for many decades the policy of our country was aimed at achieving a scientific, intellectual, technical and technological level that ensures the achievement of military parity. And this, of course, significantly changed the entire structure of public relations, affected the standard of living, allowed us to promote ideological work, and pursue anti-American policies. The influence of scientocrats and technocrats on the political processes taking place in society should be considered in tandem, since often technocrats implement what the scientocrats are working on.

4. Democracy - the power of the majority over the minority. Traditionally, it is considered that democracy is the best structure of the state. But even Aristotle, Plato, Socrates, B. Russell and many other outstanding philosophers noted that one should not expect that a minority representing the interests of the majority will take care of it (the majority). There is a very real danger of individual power, which is backed by flatterers, schemers, around the leaders are less visible people who have a direct influence on the leaders. Will they take care of the interests of the majority? Unlikely. Moreover, it is now well known that elections involve huge financial costs, and often it is financial opportunities that ensure victory. It can also be noted that during periods of political innovation, changes in the existing system and the political course of the state, democracy leads to anarchy, disruption of the vertical structure of power relations and, ultimately, the destruction of the state up to the loss of state integrity. C. G. Jung emphasizes that democracy is not suitable for any conditions and is not an ideal form state structure. He defends the point of view on the relationship between the individual, society and the state, according to which it is unwise to impose democracy by decree where there is no historical, social and political basis for it.

5. Autocracy - the power of the strong over the weak. As we have repeatedly noted, power is not violence, although it is associated with it in the first place. It is human nature not only to strive to dominate others, but also to be necessary for other people, to help them, to become useful. This tendency forces us to look for another person, someone who should be obeyed, obeyed, and guided.

6. Plutocracy - the power of the have over the have-nots. Public opinion forces plutocrats to avoid overt and overt attempts to gain political power. But the influence of plutocrats on the political processes taking place in society is very great. The most well-known methods are lobbying the interests of bankers, industrialists, and representatives of the military-industrial complex. Plutocrats provide financial support for their candidates in the elections. And it is quite possible to imagine a situation in which before the election of the head of the city or the governor, the plant director, who does not support them, sends all his employees in the amount of 30 thousand people on unpaid leave for 2 months. And explains this step by the fact that the city (region) administration did not pay under the contracts for the work performed and goods produced (whether this is true or not, no one will know). You can imagine in advance how people who are left without means of subsistence will vote. The power of plutocrats (especially in our conditions) is extremely great, although it often manifests itself in an implicit, hidden form.

7. Partocracy - the power of the organized over the unorganized. Political parties are carriers of models of power structure, and it is impossible to avoid partisanship, the very fact of the appearance and existence of parties, and their influence on the life of society. These structures take on such functions as the design of power mechanisms, their production and operation. Attitudes toward political parties range from utter disregard for them to absolute reverence.

8. Raytocracy - the power of writers over readers. At present, society has moved from the post-industrial age to the information age. The entire information environment in which a person is located is 100% artificial. People know and understand only what was prepared in advance and presented to them by the raitocrats. The same applies to political leaders. They are also at the mercy of the raitocrats, using the information and information that the raitocrats have prepared for them.

[**Vladislav Inozemtsev:**](http://snob.ru/profile/about/25538)**Five reasons why there will be no democracy in Russia**

**The historical trials that have befallen our country and its people have always required unity and disregard for individual values.**

In political theory, there are many definitions of democracy, and each of them indicates a number of its characteristic features. Without striving for originality, let's take the definition of L. Diamond from his well-known lecture What is Democracy?; the first and most important feature of democracy is the ability of the people to choose and replace the government through free and fair elections (to choose and replace the government through free and fair elections). Today, as most political scientists, and not necessarily pro-Kremlin ones, believe, there is an imperfect democracy in Russia; it is called "illiberal", "sovereign"," managed " or something else, but the very fact of its existence is denied by few. And even those who are ready to say that we are living under a new authoritarianism do not remember with a tear in their eye the coveted "democracy that we lost" in the late 1980s or even in the 1990s.

I am afraid to sound cynical and pessimistic, but I am convinced that my colleagues are wrong. Pay attention to the replacing keyword — and the picture becomes completely different. Did the voters in the 21st-century democratic Russia succeed at least once in ousting Vladimir Putin as leader? Or, perhaps, such an opportunity presented itself to them in 1996 in relation to the most democratic Boris Yeltsin? Or was the father of Perestroika, Mikhail Gorbachev, not trusted in any elections? Has there ever been a change of General Secretary in free debates at CPSU congresses? Did someone choose a Provisional Government? Or maybe the Constituent Assembly managed to change the power in the country? You don't have to continue any further. What is the conclusion? To be perfectly honest, only one thing: in Russia, for the last thousand years, democracy did not exist and does not exist today. There were periods when the opinion of the population meant something, but that was all. Moreover, for a change of power, even at the will of significant masses of the people, as it was in February 1917 or in 1991, it was necessary... to destroy the state itself, since there was simply no other way to get rid of its leader (and probably does not exist to this day, therefore illegal agitation is equated we have to encroach on the state system).

Why has Russia not been, is not, and probably will not be, or, at best, will not soon become a democracy? In my opinion, there are at least five important reasons for this.

**1. History**

The first is largely related to the specifics of Russian history. In Russia, the role of the individual is historically great — and, I would say, overestimated. For centuries, the country has been associated with the state, and the state — with the figure of the ruler. With very few exceptions, the power of the sovereign has not been challenged, and it has almost never been challenged in terms of appeal to relatively broad political forces. Yes, there were coups and assassinations of tsars and emperors, but even in such cases (as, for example, in 1741), new figures turned out to be carriers of purely personal qualities. For a long time, power in the country remained not political, but symbolic; collective associations did not play any role in it. There were no groups competing for decades, no pressure on the ruler from the nobility, no confrontation between secular and spiritual authorities. The result was an incredible personalization of power, the analogues of which were found only in the history of Eastern despotisms. Even when ideologies became a "material force," not much has changed in Russia. Can the same Communist Party be called a party if it pursued such different policies on its own behalf, as under Stalin and Gorbachev? Whatever outwardly civilized forms Russian politics may take, it has always been built around personalities.

The closer we get to modernity, the more noticeable this fact becomes, the more it contrasts with the dominant trends of the era. Democracy is an extremely rational form of government, while being based on the possibility of an alternative. When in the first "democratic" elections the main slogan becomes "Vote with your heart!" (it is clear that there is no need for intelligence here), and the main refrain is "we have no alternative", only an idiot can assume that this country has a normal future. Why did Poland become a democratic country? Because here the law was above "interests" — and in 1995, the former editor of the local Komsomolskaya Pravda received more votes than Lech Walesa, and became president. Why has Russia remained an Asian dictatorship? Because in 1996 ,the "supreme good" did not allow a democratic change of power to take place. In any democratic country, political beliefs and ideology are fundamental, hence the development of the party system necessary for any democracy. The current Russian president has managed to sit in three political parties (each time the ruling ones) — and even lead the fourth without being a member of it: can something more clearly prove that ideologies, beliefs and programs mean absolutely nothing in a culture where the object of reverence and respect is only an official post, power and — in a relatively subordinate, secondary measure-personal charisma?

In modern conditions, such a situation has a disastrous impact on the development of the country. There is no democracy in Russia today; there is only boundless populism. The government captures the moods of the masses, while at the same time shaping them; it is ready to modify its policies to varying degrees and even revise individual decisions, but it does not in any way imply that the population has the sovereign right to terminate its powers. The populist system is built not on program choice but on personality preference, which is why Putin is equally popular at the beginning of his first term, when he was pro-European and pro-market, and now, when he opposes the West, seeks an alliance with China and destroys the remnants of Russian entrepreneurship. Thus, the personalization of Russian politics and the almost complete disregard for ideologies, programs and methods of development of the country is the first reason why democracy in Russia does not take root.

**2. The cult of personality**

The second reason is even more important, in my opinion. Democracy is a system where society is divided into mobile groups called the minority and the majority. I'm not even going to say that the rights of a minority should be protected from the encroachments of the majority-this seems to be an axiom (although not in Russia). Something else is more important. To establish democracy, the minority and majority must be mobile, and their membership must be determined by their beliefs or political positions. Both these positions and the attitude of citizens towards them can change, and this process sets the stage for a democratic change of power. The possibility of such a shift makes each group respect the other. In Great Britain, as you know, there is Her Majesty's Government and Her Majesty's Opposition. This is happening, I repeat once again, precisely because politics in a democratic country is largely depersonalized.

In Russia, with its constant cult of personality (in the broadest sense of the word) and the dramatization of contradictions, the perception of disagreement as a crime has been formed for centuries. At all times, there were a lot of people in the country who were ready to oppose this or that regime and fight it with conviction, but any encroachment on the regime was perceived as an encroachment on the country. In principle, this attitude is understandable and understandable: if you criticize a party, you may well be an oppositionist, but if you criticize a person, then only an opponent, or, more precisely, an enemy. If this person identifies himself with the state, his opponent becomes an enemy of the people, as it happened in the long centuries of Russian history, and most recently, during the Stalinist dictatorship. The opposition turns-and this is clearly seen in the history of the 1920s-first into a "deviation", and then into "renegades". Even in much quieter times, its very right to exist is not obvious.

The current attitude towards dissenters in Russia was formed during the previous "thaw" in the 1960s, when a corresponding concept emerged: dissidents. Dissidents are perceived by society as those who do not accept the regime, that is, as people who do not so much offer the best course, but simply ignore the opinion of the majority. Agree, this is a very specific connotation: such people are not expected to have a positive program or "constructive criticism". You can accept them, but you should not take them into account. They can contribute to a political crisis and even bring down the government, as in the USSR, but they cannot become it, as it immediately became clear in Russia. Actually, even now there is no opposition in Russia — there are only dissidents, according to the authorities, who prevent their country from "rising from its knees". It is logical to suspect them of having links with external forces (as they have always been accused of by their enemies), and their only way is to reunite with their "masters" outside the Russian borders (which was practiced under the Soviet regime, and today is happening on a much more massive scale). This creates an overwhelming attitude of Russians towards the potential opposition as a group of discontented people, most likely sent from abroad and therefore not worthy of dialogue. And one can only be surprised at how quickly this culture of nihilistic rejection of dissent was restored in society, as soon as the personalist power returned to Russia in its explicit form.

Treating the opposition as a handful of traitors and deeply rooted denial of its positive significance can be called the second reason why it will be many decades before the country becomes a democracy.

**3. Resource economy**

The third reason is of a different nature, but it is also extremely significant. Russia has been and remains a resource economy throughout its history (except for a brief period in the 1950s and 1970s). The resource that the treasury and the country depend on may vary: it could be furs or gold, now oil and gas, and for many decades — bread, but the fact remains that to maintain the central government, it is necessary either to develop new territories and reserves (as in the case of energy carriers), or to force a part of the population to hard work (as in the case of agriculture). In both cases, the state plays mainly a redistributive role, focusing on how to extract wealth and to whom to allocate this or that part of it as a priority. Up to the present day, the main part of budget revenues is formed from revenues from raw material rents, and the second most important item remains revenues from customs duties and duties (they now bring the same share of budget revenues as they provided in the United States in the first years after the Civil War of 1861-1865). Entrepreneurship in Russia is traditionally viewed not as a means of improving the welfare of society, but as speculation or activity motivated solely by profit. In the minds of the population, the tasks of wealth redistribution clearly dominate over the tasks of their multiplication.

This circumstance is a powerful blocker of democracy. In many ways, democracy emerged as a system of control over the state by citizens, ensuring the development of society and making a significant contribution to its well-being. Active citizenship is highly unlikely without economic participation in society. In Russia, however, there is a situation where about 1% of the population provides up to 70% of exports and 55% of budget revenues generated by the oil and gas sector. The federal government defiantly disdains the income tax, allowing it to be managed by regional authorities (although in the United States it accounts for most of the budget revenues). From an economic point of view, in such conditions, the demand for democracy is a demand to establish the power of "freeloaders" over "breadwinners", to make sure that people who already receive everything from the state also determine its policy. In this connection, the system of property qualification that existed in early European democracies comes to mind, and it turns out that the very requirement of democratic participation in the management of the entire country in Russia looks recklessly irrational. "Rednecks" can apply to participate in the elections of local councils, mayors and even — sometimes-governors, that is, in fact, those whom they finance with their taxes, but why should they have the right to change the president and the government?

A country in which the vast majority of the population does not create wealth, but consumes it, cannot be democratic — it is no coincidence that the transition from a " participatory economy "to the demands of" bread and circuses " coincided with the transition from a republic to an empire in ancient Rome. Russia's peculiarity here is also that its dependence on natural rents is not decreasing, but is growing: the share of raw materials in exports has increased from 38% in the late Soviet period to almost 73% now, and there are no prerequisites for a change in the trend. This means, in my opinion, that democratization looks not only unrealistic, but also partly unfair. Neither the development of education, nor the development of entrepreneurial skills, nor the promotion of civic values can solve the problem: those who acquire them quickly leave the country, only increasing the proportion of people who remain waiting for alms from the state. Those who ask for alms have no reason to demand the right to determine the behavior of those who distribute them by voting - this is clearly the third obstacle to the development of democracy in Russia.

**4. The Imperial mentality**

The fourth reason is determined by the specific nature of the attitude of Russians to the viability of the government. Having formed as a country with a defensive consciousness and as a "frontier" civilization, Russia absorbed the awareness of the primacy of the community and the secondary nature of the individual. As it is sung in one famous song: "If the native country lived — and there are no other worries!" - this message is extremely strong in the world perception of the population. This leads to a pejorative attitude towards themselves and a willingness, if not to make sacrifices on their own initiative, then to justify similar sacrifices made by others, if, of course, they contribute to the real or imaginary "greatness" of the state. The most obvious manifestation of this greatness is a territory that does not grow at a well-known pace to pacifist countries. If we take into account both the scale of the controlled lands and the duration of control over them, Russia should be recognized as the largest empire in the history of mankind [see calculations given in: Taagepera, Rein. ‘An Ovеrview of the Growth of the Russian Empire’ in: Rywkin, Michael (ed.) *Russian Colonial Expansion to 1917*, London: Mansell, 1988, pp. 1–8]. As a matter of fact, you don't need to continue this line, because it looks quite clear.

Aggressive democracy is quite rare, especially during the period of universal suffrage dominance. As a rule, as democratic norms develop, States become less prone to war and violence (with the exception of operations based on ideological or humanitarian considerations, as well as defensive wars). This is where the next Russian trap comes in. History shows that in an inherently colonial country, increasing pressure on the authorities from "below" is largely an unbalancing element. In the twentieth century, the collapse of Russia was triggered twice after the most liberal and democratic reforms in its history - after 1917 and 1985. Therefore, if the goal is to "save the country" (and this slogan was and remains the most popular), then democracy looks more than a natural price that can be paid for such an achievement. Moreover, the loss of territory is an absolute criterion of failure of the ruler, while the expansion of its, or "sphere of influence", redeems all his mistakes. The reign of Peter I or Catherine II is perceived as the great epochs of Russian history not because of the transformation of Russia into a Europeanized country or the granting of liberties to the nobility, but primarily because of military successes and territorial increments. Accordingly, the freedom and openness brought by Gorbachev were forgotten amid the loss of much of the former superpower's territory. Conversely, Putin's success in wantonly retaining Russia's unwanted Chechnya in 2000 and annexing the even less valuable Crimea in 2014 has made him the country's most revered leader. Naturally, an apology for violence and aggression cannot be combined with democracy, because the concept of freedom implies greater mobility and greater opportunities. If the population of the same Crimea voted for joining Russia in order to be deprived of the right to express a different opinion in the future, it is clear why this is happening: democracy looks unacceptably risky in a system where the main value is the expansion of state borders. In other words, the main obstacle to the development of democracy in Russia is a specifically Russian understanding of the state and state interests.

**5. Corruption**

The fifth reason is one of the most original. Russia is a country where corruption and abuse of power are a characteristic feature of State institutions. This is partly due to the history, when the positions of officials served as a way to "feed" them, and partly — and the current state of affairs, when there was an unprecedented merger of public service and entrepreneurship. However, the fact remains that in order to maintain the level of corruption desired by the authorities, it is necessary to destructure society and devalue almost any form of collective action.

This is what is ideally achieved in modern Russia. A country is a community of personally free people who have the rights to acquire and dispose of property, conduct business, leave and return to the country, receive information, and so on. In private life, restrictions have long been reduced to zero. Moreover, most laws and regulations are easily circumvented, although they cannot be legally revised. The latter is especially important for maintaining a system that draws its strength from the constant creation of exceptional situations. However, this requires an important factor: the state should be opposed by an individual, not by society. Corruption, unlike lobbying, is an individual, almost intimate process. A corrupt government is stronger the more individual petitioners come to it and the fewer those who are willing to exert collective pressure on it. Therefore, Russia in its current form is an extremely individualized society: it is much easier to individually agree on an exception than to collectively change the norm [see for more details: Inozemtsev, Vladislav. “Russie, une société libre sous contrôle authoritaire” в: *Le Monde diplomatique*, 2010, № 10 (Octobre), pp. 4–5]. I think it is unnecessary to say that democracy is a process of formalized change of norms with the participation of the broad masses of the public: thus, it turns out that the entire system of organization of the Russian government is directly focused on preventing the creation of conditions for the formation of democratic institutions. It is also worth noting that this situation is not imposed on society: being rational people, a significant part of Russians understand that the existing organization does not necessarily complicate life, but often even simplifies it, because the same bribe often solves problems that cannot be overcome in any other way. Democratizing society means not just getting rid of thieving officials, but also putting yourself in a position to comply with rules that the vast majority of Russians, alas, do not intend to comply with.

The latter means that the growing degree of personal freedom in an authoritarian society leads in the most unexpected way to the formation of an "anti-democratic consensus", which acts as the fifth obstacle to democratic transformation.

\* \* \*

What is the conclusion that follows from all of the above? In my opinion, this is a conclusion about the fundamental lack of demand for democracy in Russian society. The desire for freedom and autonomy, the sense of superiority of individual goals over state tasks, the attitude towards the government as an institution for ensuring public goods, rather than a sacred symbol, the readiness for collective action, rather than an individual solution to systemic contradictions — all these prerequisites for a democratic society are largely absent in the Russian consciousness. Any historical trials that befell our country and its people required their unity and disregard for individual values, and not vice versa. Therefore, I do not see any chance that a free and democratic society will suddenly turn out to be an ideal for a significant part of Russians.

The only way out, in my opinion, may consist in external influence. The undemocratic Russian system of statehood is ineffective — and on one or another historical horizon, it will require such sacrifices from the population that they will not be ready to accept. The country's foreign policy and foreign economic orientation will also require important decisions in the future regarding the choice between the West and the East, between a democratic and authoritarian path of development. As a result, the country will sooner or later have no acceptable alternative to greater rapprochement with Europe, of which Russia has been a historical part for many centuries (and to which it has constantly been drawn economically, culturally and socially). The European state system will inevitably require fundamental changes in the organization of the country's political life and, to put it bluntly and clearly, the establishment of a democratic regime.

Democracy is largely a process of de-authorizing the ruler, transferring some of their powers to the people, and accepting external, i.e., non - "sacred", legitimization. Given that Russia has historically developed and now has a system based on the principle of "the state is me", *the desuverenization of the ruler can only be realized through the desuverenization of the state itself*. And if we do not talk about the occupation (impossible in the Russian case), then there is only one simple and understandable way: joining the country to a supranational association with a single center of power and rule-making. As bitter as this thesis may sound, I see no reason to believe that Russia can become a democracy before the main legislative, judicial and executive decisions are no longer taken in Moscow. *"Real sovereignty" and real democracy in Russia are incompatible* — so far, everything suggests that when choosing between the former and the latter, democratic rules will not be preferable. As a matter of fact, it is precisely this circumstance that most clearly answers the question raised in the title of the article.

*Summary of the report presented by the author at the international congress The Freedom Games 2015 in Lodz (Poland) on October 17, 2015.*

Examples of political solutions (2009)

1. Evo Morales - President of Bolivia

*Defeated your enemies with a hunger strike*

In the political confrontation with the parliament, the head of state won a brilliant victory in the spirit of Mahatma Gandhi. The reason for the conflict was the adoption of a new electoral law that expanded the voting rights of the Indian population, and the appointment of an early election date: Morales insisted on an earlier date, and the parliament wanted to delay the election, hoping that during this time the president's popularity would fall.

After the classic methods of political pressure failed, Morales recalled the good old days when he was the leader of the coca farmers ' union. He did not bargain, threaten to resign, file a lawsuit with the Supreme Court, dissolve parliament, or bring tanks into the capital. He went on a hunger strike. For five days, the head of state, surrounded by one and a half thousand supporters, sat on water and coca leaves, which helped him maintain a weakened body. And on the sixth day, the parliament surrendered, accepting all the conditions of the president.

Now the election will be held exactly at the time that Morales expected, and this was his double victory: not only will he not have time to lose popularity before the election, but he has also gained new supporters. When Morales confronted the parliament not as a politician, but as an ordinary dissident or just an extreme citizen, he achieved more than he expected — it was a spectacular and effective political action.

2. Cristina Fernandez de Crisner-President of Argentina

*Made soccer free*

With her strong-willed decision, the president saved one of the greatest values of Maradona's homeland — the Argentine football Championship. This summer, the country was threatened with a huge scandal: the Football Association of Argentina (AFA) broke the exclusive contract for the right to broadcast championship matches with the pay TV channel TSC, demanding a three-fold increase in the price. This money was the last hope for the AFA, because the crisis brought most clubs to such a deplorable state that they actually stopped paying their players ' salaries. Those, in turn, refused to open the season. As a result, the championship did not start at the scheduled time.

Despite the fact that football is strictly a men's game, the woman President Kirchner felt the pain of the nation best of all. She discussed the issue with Prime Minister Anibal Fernandez and persuaded him to allocate $130 million to pay for the broadcast of matches on the state TV channel. The championship was saved. Moreover, football has not only returned to the country's screens, but has also become free.

The Argentine media unanimously called it a historic day. "The government has set itself the task of making it possible for all Argentines to watch football matches. Today, this goal has been achieved, " the President announced. Such gestures are not forgotten, especially on the most football continent in the world — in South America.

3. Noh Moo-hyun-former President of South Korea

*Spawithhigh self-confidence*

After leaving the top job, Noh Moo Hyun was charged with corruption. But on May 23, in one move, he silenced his critics forever: during a morning walk in the mountains, he took a step into a 30-meter chasm and fell to his death.

A few weeks earlier, the ex-president had to spend very unpleasant hours in the Prosecutor General's Office, where he was interrogated on the case of receiving $6 million from the president of the Taekwan shoe company through the wife and husband of one of his nieces. After Noh Moo Hyun's death, an entry was found on his personal computer: "I had to go through a difficult time. It was too hard. I owe it to too many people. The pain I caused them is too great to measure these days. Because of my poor health, I can't do anything. I can't read or write. Don't be too sad. Aren't life and death part of nature? Do not be sad and do not blame anyone — this is fate."

The fate that Noh wrote about in his farewell note has come full circle. He came to power under anti-corruption slogans, and several officials committed suicide in high-profile trials that took place shortly after his inauguration. And now the ex-president himself is in the same situation. In accordance with the Confucian tradition, he had only one way out: only suicide removes all charges from a person. This tradition in Korea determines the behavior of people not only in everyday life, but also in politics. Immediately after the death of the ex-president, the prosecutor's office announced that the case against his family would be closed.

4. Mikhail Prokhorov-businessman

*Became a Yerudin citizen*

On April 20, a well-known Russian entrepreneur checked out of his comfortable Moscow apartment and a few days later registered in the taiga village of Yeruda in the Krasnoyarsk Territory. The businessman became the 89th Yerudin citizen. Mostly in the village live shift workers who work at the local mining and processing plant and gold extraction factory - their co-owner is Mikhail Prokhorov. He said that he owns an apartment in Yeruda, where he visited twice and even spent the night.

Changing your residence permit is nothing but a generous gift to the Krasnoyarsk Territory. After all, now Prokhorov will pay income tax here. "Last year I conducted a number of transactions for significant amounts,"he explained." As a result, there were significant tax payments that I think it is right to pay where they were earned." The businessman modestly kept silent about the amount of transactions, but the press quickly reported to Krasnoyarsk residents that in 2008 he sold Vladimir Potanin a 50% stake in the KM Invest joint venture for more than $5 billion, and the tax on this transaction alone amounted to 16 billion rubles.

It is significant that Mikhail Prokhorov changed his residence permit in order to have time to file a tax return at his new place of residence before May 1. The effect was instantaneous: income tax receipts to the treasury of the Krasnoyarsk Territory increased by 63% at once. Prokhorov's 16 billion rubles will cover more than half of the region's budget deficit of 30 billion rubles.

Even Moscow felt the loss: together with the citizen Prokhorov, it immediately lost 1% of budget revenues!

5. Angela Merkel-German Chancellor

The German Chancellor openly supported the Austro-Canadian-Russian consortium Magna-Sberbank in the fight for 55% of the Opel carmaker. She called their Opel restructuring plan the most reliable.

The statement is all the more valuable because it came at the height of the battle for Opel between Sberbank, the Belgian investment fund RHJ and China's Beijing Automotive. And the outcome of this struggle was not obvious. The owner of Opel, the American auto giant General Motors, was not particularly eager to see Russian representatives among the main shareholders of one of its divisions. But since the sale of Opel would still have taken place — this was a prerequisite for GM to provide assistance from the US government — there was a high probability that the concern would be bought by the Belgians or the Chinese. Angela Merkel's lobbying move came in handy. Moreover, at the same time, the German government actually linked the victory in the competition of the Austro-Canadian-Russian consortium with the issuance of Opel up to €4.5 billion in state loans. And in the end, GM decided in favor of the Canadian-Russian bid.

It is clear that Angela Merkel's statements were not dictated by altruism and pure love for Russia. Unlike other bidders, the Magna-Sberbank consortium has promised not to close its Opel plants in Germany. On the eve of the Bundestag elections, this was very important for Merkel.

Nevertheless, the Bundeschancellor's spirit should be noted: in recent years, opposition to the purchase of Western companies by Russian capital has become almost a good tone in European politics. In this situation, it takes great courage to openly support the Russian buyer Opel. Moreover, in parallel, Angela Merkel discussed other serious Russian investments in the German economy, in particular the purchase of one of the largest manufacturers of microelectronics Infineon Technologies AG and the Wadan Yards shipyards

6. Kenny MacAxill-Scottish Justice Secretary

*Released the terrorist*

The decision to release a Libyan man serving a life sentence, Abdelbasset Ali al-Megrahi, who was found guilty of bombing a plane over the Scottish village of Lockerbie in 1988, MacAskill, according to him, made "for humanitarian reasons": the Libyan has cancer, and doctors said that he had several months to live.

But not everyone believed in the minister's sincerity. The Scottish government was accused of making a deal with Libyan leader Gaddafi: freedom of al-Megrahi in exchange for promoting the gas project of the largest British energy company BP in Libya worth $900 million. The British government is generally very interested in Libyan energy resources. After all, after the North Sea runs out of gas and oil, Libya may be the only alternative source of gas supplies to Russia.

The British authorities strongly denied the economic background of al-Megrahi's release. But in the end, UK Justice Secretary Jack Straw admitted in an interview with the Daily Telegraph that trade ties and the BP oil deal were "an essential part" of the decision.

In addition, it turned out that the services of doctors who concluded that the terrorist had three months to live were paid for by the Libyan authorities. And BP itself admitted that back in 2007 it asked the UK government to extradite a terrorist with cancer to Libya.

Al-Megrahi's release caused particular indignation in the United States. The passengers on the plane that was blown up over Lockerbie were mostly Americans. Then 270 people were killed.

7. Robert Gates-US Secretary of Defense

*Saved money on PRO*

Announced the US abandonment of plans to deploy missile defense elements in Eastern Europe. Gates ' position is unique: the man who holds the post of Secretary of Defense calls for a reduction in spending on certain types of weapons. This is partly due to the change in missile defense plans.

8. Hugo Chavez - President ofVenezuela

*Became a dictator*

On the second attempt, he won the right to be re-elected as head of state an unlimited number of times. He won the referendum on this issue in February with a minimal margin.

9. Kurmanbek Bakiyev-President of Kyrgyzstan

*Chased away NATO*

Denounced agreements with the countries participating in the anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan on the deployment of their military contingents at the Manas air base. But just a few days after that, he signed a new agreement with the United States on the creation of a NATO transit transportation center at Manas airport-read more: the same database, but for much more money.

10. Dalia Grybauskaite-President of Lithuania

*Refused money and wine*

She canceled the inaugural banquet so as not to waste people's money in a crisis, and later refused half of her salary.

Shoichi Nakagawa -Ministry of Finance of Japan

*He quit after showing up drunk at a press conference*

The appearance of the minister at a press conference following the G-7 summit on February 14 in Rome puzzled many. Shoichi Nakagawa hastened to resign. And the other day he was found dead at his home. The police do not rule out that the former minister committed suicide.

11. Hu Jintao-President of the People's Republic of China

*Quelled the riot*

He gave the order to strictly stop riots in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. Hu said local authorities should "isolate and target a small group" of rioters and " unite and nurture the Uighur majority."

12. Daniel Ortega - пformer resident of Nicaragua

*Recognized the unrecognized*

Nicaragua is the second UN member after Russia to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

13.Joel Fitzgibbon-Minister of Defence of Australia

*Pleaded guilty*

He resigned after being accused of not declaring the services rendered to him. In particular, the rooms in one of the Brisbane hotels at the price of $450 were paid for by the NIB insurance fund. This was enough for the man who was considered the best defense minister in recent decades to resign.

14. Hamid Karzai - пformer Resident of Afghanistan

*Became an anti-Americanist*

On the eve of the presidential election in Afghanistan, he began to actively criticize the United States: "The Americans are secretly putting pressure on Karzai, because they want to easily manage him. They're wrong." Whether the anti­-American attacks helped or something else is unknown, but he won the election.

15. Guy Vanhengel-inICA-Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of Belgium

*Declared bankruptcy*

 "Belgium is a virtual bankrupt" — this is how Guy Vanhengel described the financial situation in the country in mid-September, when it seemed that the wave of crisis had subsided. In 2009, the size of Belgium's public debt was 97% of GDP, tax revenues decreased by 7%, GDP-by 3.4%.

16. Manmohan Singh-Prime Minister ofIndia

*Fell in love with Bush*

Arriving to visit the" lame duck "— US President George W. Bush, I assured him: "The people of India sincerely love you." These words caused a storm of indignation in India, although they have their own truth: judging by­opinion polls, George Bush personally had a positive opinion of at least 60% of Indians.

17. Rod Blagojevich-Governorof the State of Illinois

*Decided to sell the position*

And not just any one, but the seat of the senator from Illinois, which was occupied by Barack Obama before being elected president. Unfortunately for the governor, his conversations had long been monitored by the FBI, and the "deal" fell through. Blagojevich was arrested.

18. Asif Ali Zardari -Permanent Resident of Pakistan

*Banned jokes about yourself*

Now the Pakistani security services are required to track their distribution in blogs, via SMS and email. Violators of the ban face up to 14 years in prison.

19. Joao Bernardo Vijayra-pResident of Guinea-Bissau

*Killed the enemy and died himself*

He ordered the assassination of his enemy, Chief of Staff Tagme Na Vaya. The order was executed, but the military loyal to the Chief of the General Staff killed the president himself for this.

20.Arnold Schwarzenegger is theCalifornia governor

*Became the Terminator of California*

Back in July, I decided to issue salaries to civil servants in promissory notes. California, a potential bankrupt, has­often used them to pay its bills.

21. Vladimir Putin-Pierre-Minister of Russia

*Yelled at the oligarch*

Personally intervened in the resolution of the conflict in the single-industry town of Pikalyovo. His dialogue with Oleg Deripaska became a symbol of crisis management of the Russian economy manually: "Why don't I see your signature?! Go here and sign it… Come here… Here is the contract… Just give me the fountain pen here." This act is already sung in songs and jokes: "Putin goes to Pikalevo / Putin will make us cool!"

22. Barack Obama is apermanent resident of the United States.

*Poured beer on racism*

He invited James Crowley, a police officer, and Henry Gates, a professor at Harvard University, to the White House. White Sergeant Crowley arrested black Gates on July 16 in his own home, reacting to an erroneous signal about an attempted robbery. Obama called the sergeant's actions stupid. However, the publication of police conversations showed that the sergeant had grounds for such actions. The "beer summit" is a spectacular gesture that is unlikely to solve racial problems in the United States, but demonstrates­Obama's ability to work with voters.

23. Brian Goodman-Head of the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Council

*Recognized apartheid on the contrary*

Canadian immigration authorities­have granted asylum to a white South African citizen. He told Canadian authorities that he could not return to his homeland after being attacked seven times and stabbed three times because he was white. The Canadian authorities considered him a victim of racial discrimination. South Africa called Canada's decision racist.

ТиPeople's preferences based on which of the needs prevailsin the structure of power motivation (S. B. Kaverin)

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Dominant need | Personality type |
| Need for freedom | Nonconformist |
| Hedonistic need | Conformist |
| Need for self affirmation | Dictator  |
| The Need for self-expression | Adventurer  |
| The Need to Be a Person | Democrat  |

Types of power relations in society

Power can be classified on various grounds. For example, from the point of view of its social level, you can distinguish:

a) power on the scale of the whole society;

b) power within a particular collective (organization);

c) power in a relationship between two individuals.

For example: the power of the clan, the power of the tribe, the power of the community

Depending on the resources on which subordination is based, the main types of power are distinguished. Thus, H. Heckhausen distinguishes six types of power.

1. Power is rewarding. Its strength is determined by B's expectation of the extent to which A will be able to satisfy one of his (B's) motives and how much A will make this satisfaction dependent on B's desired behavior.

2. Coercive power. Its strength is determined by B's expectation, first, of the extent to which A is able to punish him for actions undesirable to A, and, second, how much A will make the dissatisfaction of B's motive dependent on his undesirable behavior. The compulsion here is that therange of possible actions As a result of the threat of punishment is narrowed. In the extreme case, the power of coercion can be exercised directly physically.

3. Regulatory authority. We are talking about internalized norms, according to which A has the right to control compliance with certain rules of behavior and, if necessary, insist on them.

4. Reference power. It is based on B's identification with A and B's desire to be like A.

5. Expert authority. It depends on the amount of special knowledge, intuition, or skills attributed to A by B that relate to the area of behavior in question.

6. Information power. This power takes place when A has information that can make B see the consequences of his behavior in a new light.

Power can also be divided into political and non-political. Political power is that power that can act as a means of solving political problems, that is, a means of implementing and protecting the interests of large social groups. Types of political power are the power of one social group (community) over another (for example, the rule of one class over another); state power; party power, as well as other political organizations and movements; and the power of political leaders.

Power within a particular social community (society, collective, organization, etc.), depending on the method of organization and power, can be democratic or undemocratic. Moreover, this division applies not only to political power, but also to any other power related to collective management, since democracy can also be non-political.

Among the non-political types of power, one can distinguish family power (parental power, power relations between spouses). as the most important one with a long history. Religious power, ecclesiastical power. The power is symbolic. Administrative power, etc.

Spanish political scientist F. Lorda-i-Alais analyzes economic, military, information power and the power of fear (phobocracy) in his work. When describing economic power (plutocracy), he notes that it represents wealth turned into an instrument of domination in society. Economic power is a power based on wealth. Its main asset is money. Currently, the author notes, the economic power has reached an exceptional consolidation force. Economic power itself does not resort to violence, but it is capable of shamelessly flouting all divine and human norms. It seems to remain behind the curtain, but largely dictates the behavior of actors on the public stage.

[**Stalin's reforms**](http://politmnenie.ru/iosif-stalin/reformy-stalina.html)

**Joseph Stalin**, an educated and talented man, put all his heart and soul into creating a powerful state with a developed economy. He has implemented a number of unique reforms, knowing exactly what he can achieve with them. He was an unsurpassed politician, which is why he managed to create the USSR that he is remembered for. Even if sometimes at the cost of the lives of hundreds of thousands of people.

**The Monetary Reform of 1922-1927.**

Realizing the need for a transition to a new economic policy (NEP), Grigory Sokolnikov implemented a monetary reform. But Joseph Stalin had plans for the state, so he made efforts to overthrow the NEP and curtail the reform.

* [Monetary Reform 1922-1927](http://politmnenie.ru/iosif-stalin/reformy-stalina/denezhnaya-reforma-1922-1927.html)

**The Triad of 1929-1940**

**Stalin's Triad Reforms:**

* [Part one-Industrialization.](http://politmnenie.ru/iosif-stalin/reformy-stalina/triada-1929-1940gg/145-qtriadaq-chast-pervaya-industrializacziya.html)
* [Part two - Collectivization.](http://politmnenie.ru/iosif-stalin/reformy-stalina/triada-1929-1940gg/148-kollektivizacziya.html)
* [Part Three-The Cultural Revolution.](http://politmnenie.ru/iosif-stalin/reformy-stalina/triada-1929-1940gg/157-kulturnaya-revolyucziya.html)

**Stalin's military reforms.**

Joseph Stalin, who wanted the army to be a prestigious part of the state, was able to carry out military reform and equip the military personnel with the necessary equipment. This allowed the USSR to survive and repel the aggression of the German coalition. And a series of powerful attacks, referred to as "Stalin's 10 blows", was the beginning of victory. Joseph Stalin used a military trick, realizing that surprise is the most important factor in any victory.

First, a base was created for the fleet, combat units, logistics institutions and headquarters. Secondly, emphasis was placed on the construction of secondary and higher military educational institutions. Finally, the military-industrial complex began to develop rapidly.

**World War II and World War II reforms :**

* [Stalin's military reform](http://politmnenie.ru/iosif-stalin/reformy-stalina/184-voennaya-reforma-stalina.html)
* [10 blows of Stalin. Part One](http://politmnenie.ru/iosif-stalin/reformy-stalina/186-10-udarov-stalina-chast-pervaya.html)
* [10 blows of Stalin. Part of deut](http://politmnenie.ru/iosif-stalin/reformy-stalina/187-10-udarov-stalina-chast-vtoraya.html)

**Post-war reforms of Stalin.**

One of the most ambitious reforms of Joseph Stalin is the five-year plan for the restoration of the USSR economy after World War II. thanks to the strict framework that Stalin set, in 5 years the country again reached its previous level, restoring the lost ten industries.

* [Stalin's post-war reforms: a five-year plan](http://politmnenie.ru/iosif-stalin/reformy-stalina/postvoennye-reformy.html)

 Great Patriotic War War. The tragedy, which claimed the lives of more than 27 million people, brought devastation, unemployment, and fatigue to the country. All spheres of life – economy, metallurgy, mechanical engineering, light and food industries-were in decline. Not to mention science and education, which in wartime simply turned a blind eye. Along with other states that participated in World War II, the USSR suffered the most, because the fiercest battles were fought on our territory. Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin simply could not allow the USSR to lag behind other countries. To restore the national economy of the country, a five-year plan was introduced at his suggestion.

The goal of this plan was to restore the most war-affected areas of the country. Many cities were destroyed, namely around 1700. More than 70,000 small villages were razed to the ground. And this is not to mention 31,850 destroyed factories, thousands of abandoned mines, 60,000 kilometers of destroyed railway tracks, 37 million hectares of crops that simply fell into disrepair. The USSR lost a third of all that it had. Huge losses. And so in order to return all this, Stalin decided on a five-year plan. Moreover, all this was conducted in the conditions of the Cold War.

So, to begin with, some military factories were reoriented to the production of goods for the population and a law was issued on the demobilization of part of the army personnel. This meant that part of the population of the USSR was transferred to a peaceful life, to peaceful construction. People began to believe in a better life.

This was supported by the fact that normal working conditions were introduced at the enterprises. Previously mandatory overtime hours were canceled, and the usual 8-hour working day was returned. They gave me vacations, which were also paid for. The Council of Ministers reviewed the budget for the coming year and reduced payments to the army and military-industrial complex, paying more attention to the development of civilian sectors of the economy. This was the beginning.  The overall economic recovery and viability of the USSR was scheduled for 1950.

So, the main direction of the five-year plan was made for the development of heavy industry. Significant human resources were also transferred here. And the entire heavy industry of the country was once again based on scientific and technological progress. Joseph Stalin is Joseph Stalin. He was always true to himself, and always appreciated the development of science and education. Agree, in order to retrain military factories for the production of civilian products, you need to at least change the production technology. And this requires new equipment-once, training-twice.

What I would like to note is that in addition to reviving the old, Stalin gave a decree to develop new ones. So new coal deposits were being developed in the East.

The result of the five-year plan was 6 thousand new industrial enterprises. For many years since the collapse of the USSR, our "new" government has not built ANYTHING. They began to develop the gas industry, metallurgy,and mechanical engineering. We started developing nuclear power. And all this was equipped with new technologies. And this created the basis for new jobs, because since the end of the Second World War and World War II, unemployment has decreased almost 2 times.

**Fatal reform.**

One of Stalin's most fateful reforms was to purge the USSR of incompetent people - members of the party nomenclature. The fear that low – level officials would no longer be needed led them to the very last resort-the murder of Joseph Stalin as secretary of the Central Committee.

# Putin's actions in Crimea resemble Hitler's behavior in the Sudetenland - Russian historian

**Andrei Zubov, a well-known Russian historian and lecturer at the Moscow Institute of International Relations, believes that Putin's scheme in**[Crimea](http://www.ukrinform.ua/rus/news/v_krimu_agitatori_za_referendum_prinugdayut_selskih_giteley_oformlyat_rossiyskie_pasporta_1611133)**coincides with Hitler's plans to capture Austria, the Sudetenland (former Czechoslovakia) or Klaipeda (Lithuania) by Nazi Germany in 1938-39.**

**In an exclusive comment**[to the BTB](http://btbtv.com.ua/)**TV channel, he noted that the ideology that** [accompanies Putin's actions](http://www.ukrinform.ua/rus/news/ukrainskie_deti_otpravili_putinu_igrushechnih_soldatikov_1610123)**on the peninsula is also very similar to the reasons under which Hitler "liberated" the German population of these territories.**

"Similar signs-they shocked me so much from the very beginning, when I learned about the beginning of operations of unspecified forces in the Crimea on the night of February 26-27. I immediately had a resemblance to the actions of the Nazis in Austria, the Sudetenland and Memel (Klaipeda). Areas that were really inhabited mainly by Germans, but belonged to other states, although absolutely not oppressed. Klaipeda had an autonomous region and its own sejm. In the Sudetenland, there was internal self-government with a language and schools. Austria was simply the second German state with all the rights that the German population had. Therefore, in principle, there was no reason to save them. But Hitler had several goals to achieve. First, to achieve a stir among its population. Because nothing excites the people so much, especially those who lost the war, who were humiliated and lost part of their land, as the renewal of national greatness. The leader who does this will be carried in their arms. This is the way Hitler went, " Zubov said.

He noted that then Hitler was afraid that the German population in the referendum may be against joining Germany, and therefore first sent troops. "Plebiscites were held in Austria after the occupation by German troops. The troops entered on March 11, and the plebiscite was held on April 10. Although the Austrian Chancellor Shushnik said that he was ready to hold a plebiscite and see how the people would express themselves. And he scheduled a plebiscite for March 13. Absolutely free. But the country was specially occupied on the 11th, so that it would not take place. And the plebiscite was already held under the bayonets of the Nazis. And, of course, 99.75% of Austrians voted for joining the Reich, " the expert recalled.

Returning to the events in Crimea, Zubov noted:: "It all seemed very close to me. And the idea of national unification, and the frenzy of restoring the greatness of the country, and, in spite of everything, the fear of these peoples. What if they don't want Hitler? Or, say, they want to, but - 60%? Then there will be no such triumph. Therefore, we need to control everything by the army, " he said. "The same thing happened in Crimea. First occupied, then re-elected the Prime Minister as soon as they announced their desire to join. First, on May 25, then on March 30, then on March 16, a referendum is scheduled - they are in a hurry. The same case, " he said.

At the same time, he stressed that there is a huge difference in the situation: in the 30-40s, the West was afraid to oppose Hitler and agreed that Hitler should create attempts to oppose the Bolshevik USSR. Now, according to Andrey Zubov , the West is not afraid of Russia and will not "swallow" the seizure of Crimea. Moscow may find itself in complete political isolation.

"Then Germany got away with everything, because the West (the victorious countries of the First World War) were afraid of the Communists, the Comintern. And Hitler created the Anti-Comintern Pact. They believed that Germany would be a wall in front of the USSR, " he recalled. "Now the West is not afraid of any aggressive actions of Russia. And in this sense, Russia will certainly find itself in complete political isolation. And even its CIS allies, even China, have either remained silent or condemned these actions. Therefore, we should not expect that the world will eat up, as they ate the Anschluss and the annexation of the Sudetenland and Klaipeda, and the occupation of Czechoslovakia itself, " he said. Perhaps political, perhaps economic, but very sensitive for Russia." - the expert is convinced.

# THE MAIN FORMS OF MANIFESTATION OF POLITICAL POWER

The main forms of political power include domination, leadership, and governance.

Political power is most clearly manifested in domination. Domination is a mechanism for the exercise of power, which takes institutional forms and involves the division of society into dominant and subordinate groups, hierarchy and social distance between them, the allocation and isolation of a special administrative apparatus.

The most developed theory of domination belongs to M. Weber. He gave a typology of forms of legitimate domination, which still remains dominant in modern Western sociology and political science.

According to M. Weber, domination means the probability that orders will be obeyed by a certain group of people, legitimate domination cannot be limited to the fact of political realization of power, it needs faith in its legitimacy and is associated with the separation of powers, with the isolation of a special administrative management apparatus that ensures the execution of prescriptions and orders. Otherwise, domination relies mainly on violence, which is the case in despotisms.

M. Weber distinguishes three types of legitimate domination (according to their source).

First, it is traditional, based on the habitual, most often unreflected belief in the sanctity of long-accepted traditions and in the legality of the power rights granted by them. These traditional norms of power relations indicate who has the right to power and who is obliged to obey it, they are the basis for the manageability of society and the obedience of its citizens. This type of power relations is most clearly seen in the example of hereditary monarchy.

Second, it is a charismatic type of power relationship that is rooted in personal loyalty to a person who has initiated an order based on faith in their special relationship with God and a great historical destiny. This type of power relations is based not on established laws and not on the order sanctified by centuries-old tradition, but on the charisma of the leader, who is considered a prophet, a giant historical figure, a demigod performing a "great mission". "Loyalty to the charisma of a prophet or leader in war, or a prominent demagogue in a popular assembly... or in parliament, "writes M. Weber," just means that a person of this type is considered internally "called" to lead people, that the latter obey him not because of custom or institution, but because they believe in him."

The charismatic type of government, in contrast to the rational-legal one, is authoritarian. A variation of this type in our country was the system of power in the period of Stalinism. At the heart of that power was the reliance not only on force, but also on the unquestionable authority of Stalin, the party among the majority of the population of the USSR. While emphasizing the predominantly authoritarian, despotic nature of the power relations of the Stalinist era, one should not deny the presence of elements of democracy even in those conditions, but, of course, mostly formal ones.

M. Weber saw images of charismatic leaders in Buddha, Christ, Mahomet, as well as Solomon, Pericles, Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, and Napoleon. The twentieth century has seen its own galaxy of charismatic leaders. This type of leader includes Lenin and Stalin, Mussolini and Hitler, Roosevelt, Nehru, and Mao Tse-tung.

The charismatic type of power is more characteristic of a society that is experiencing an era of radical changes and revolutionary upheavals. With the name of the leader, the masses associate the possibility of making favorable changes in their lives and the life of society. The word of a leader is surrounded by a halo of infallibility, his works are elevated to the rank of "sacred books", the truth of which cannot be questioned, but the charisma of a leader, although connected with his ideas, depends primarily on the emotional commitment of the masses. When paying attention to this, it should be borne in mind that the masses are constantly waiting for the leader to confirm his special, exceptional qualities as a leader. Repeated failures can lead to the loss of the leader's image of an outstanding personality. Therefore, charismatic power is less stable than traditional and rational-legal power. This is also evident in our modern political life. It is enough to recall the beginning of Mikhail Gorbachev's political activity as a political leader of the USSR and the last months of his stay as President of the USSR to see the contrast between his image of 1985-1987 and December 1991. It can be argued that something similar happened with the image of Boris Yeltsin, if we compare his image in August-September 1991 and its perception by the masses in 1999.

Third, a rational-legal type of domination, based on a conscious belief in the legality of established procedures and in the competence of certain bodies called upon to exercise power. The most developed form of this type of power is the constitutional state, in which all are subject to a system of laws established and applied in accordance with certain principles. In a modern state, the Constitution is the basic law on which other, less significant laws, decisions, and resolutions are based. It is the Constitution that sets the rules that are binding on both the governors and the governed. This type of power relations is based on the free expression of the will of the people, the electability of all central authorities, the constitutional limitation of the sphere of state activity, and the equality of all political forces operating within the framework of the law. The rational-legal type of power is the result of a rather long evolution of society along the path of civilization.

This is the modern understanding of the main types of legitimate domination, put forward in his time by M. Weber. To compare this analysis with the original source, we will cite the core position on this problem from the work of M. Weber: "In principle, there are three types of internal justifications, that is, the grounds of legitimacy... First, it is the authority of the "eternally yesterday": the authority of morals sanctified by their primordial significance and habitual orientation to their observance - "traditional" rule, as carried out by the patriarch and patrimonial prince of the old type. Further, authority beyond the usual personal gift... (charisma), complete personal loyalty and personal trust, caused by the presence of the qualities of a leader in a certain person: revelations, heroism and others, charismatic domination, as it is carried out by a prophet, or-in the field of politics-an elected prince-commander, or a plebiscite ruler, an outstanding demagogue and a political party leader. Finally, domination by virtue of" legality", by virtue of the belief in the binding nature of legal establishment... and business "competence" based on rationally created rules, that is, an orientation towards subordination in the implementation of established rules-domination in the form in which it is carried out by a modern "civil servant" and all those carriers of power who are similar to him in this respect." And then M.Weber notes that, of course, pure types of domination are rare in life.

In fact, M. Weber in his classification gave ideal types of legitimate rule, which should not be confused with the specific political reality of a particular society. The considered types of power can only manifest themselves partially and in combination with each other. No system of power relations is exclusively traditional, rational, or charismatic. We can only talk about which of the listed types is the main or leading one. M. Weber's classification provides a working tool for understanding the complex and diverse political life of society, and this is its cognitive, heuristic value.

Describing domination, we noted that the sign of domination is hierarchy and social distance between the dominant and the subordinate. Hierarchy and social distance are expressed in differences of rank, power, prestige, strict rules of etiquette and addressing each other. Perhaps the most striking illustration of these features of domination is the table of ranks that has existed since Peterthe Great in imperial Russia. The table of ranks was a universal system that permeated the entire Russian statehood, covering everyone: from an army officer to a consistory official, from a teacher to a police officer, from a diplomat to a bank employee. It also included a system of titling, i.e. a special appeal to persons with the appropriate rank. The ranks of the 1st and 2nd classes had the title of "eminence", the 3rd and 4th "excellency", the 5th "high birth", the 6th-8th - "high birth", the 9th-14th - "nobility" .

If we take an example from our recent history, we can cite a pronounced hierarchical relationship on the example of the secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which is described in his memoirs by a former member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU N. I. Ryzhkov: "Persons... those who occupied the top three rungs of the hierarchy were the elite... it was their location, that is, the steps mentioned, that made them elite, and not their personal qualities at all. Although often it was their personal qualities that brought them to these steps... but not always... The upper one was occupied by members of the Politburo. On the middle one-candidates for membership. And on the third - secretaries. Everything was planned for them once and for all: who is sitting next to whom in different presidencies, who follows whom to the podium of the Mausoleum, who is holding what meeting and who has the right to press on what photo.

Not to mention who has what dacha, how many bodyguards, and what brand of car. Who and when established this iron order is unknown, but it is not broken even now- even after the death of the party: it has deftly moved from the CentralCommittee to other "corridors of power".

In the normative, label side of hierarchical relationships, you should not see only the negative side. In a democratic state, well-thought-out rituals, codes of conduct and other etiquette principles introduce hierarchical relations into a civilized framework, and allow us to better and more effectively solve the problems of power and management. The best minds of mankind understood this long ago. For example, as the Chinese philosopher Confucius taught 2.5 thousand yearsago: "Reverence without ritual leads to fussiness; caution without ritual leads to fearfulness; courage without rituals leads to turmoil; directness without ritual leads to rudeness."

The form of power manifestation is leadership and management. Leadership is expressed in the ability of the subject of power to exercise his will through direct and indirect influence on the objects being managed. It can be based solely on authority, on the recognition by managers of the corresponding powers of managers with minimal exercise of power-coercive functions. Political leadership manifests itself in defining the main goals of social systems and institutions, as well as ways to achieve them. Schematically, it can be defined by three main provisions:

1. Political leadership includes setting fundamental tasks, defining long-term and short-term goals that should be achieved in a certain period of time.

2. It involves the development of methods and means to achieve the goals set.

3. Political leadership also consists in selecting and placing cadres capable of understanding and fulfilling the tasks set. For example, Barack Obama, who came to the White House in January 2009, made about three thousand appointments to posts of various ranks in various administrative departments, from which the "appointees" of D. Bush (Jr.) were forced to leave.

The concept of "political leadership" is usually distinguished from the concept of "political management". The latter is expressed in the functions of direct influence, which are performed by the management apparatus, by certain officials who are not at the top of the pyramid of power. Precisely because of the essential difference between leadership and management, Lenin considered it possible to attract bourgeois specialists to perform management functions in the first years after the October Revolution. "We," wrote V. I. Lenin, " must secure the Constitution won by the revolution, but for administration, for the state structure, we must have people who possess the technique of administration, who have state and economic experience, and we have nowhereto get such people, but only from the previous class."

In short, management activity is subordinated to the goals put forward by the political leadership, it is aimed at choosing ways and mechanisms to achieve the goals set.

To show what is behind the distinction between the concepts of leadership and management, you can rely on the memoirs of former US President Reagan. So, he writes: "The President is unable to exercise daily control over the activities of all his subordinates. Its task is to set the tone, indicate the main directions, outline the general contours of policy and select capable people to implement this policy. " And further, concretizing his understanding of his role as a political leader, a leader elected for a second presidential term, he says the following: "... in the field of domestic policy, I will focus my efforts on reducing federal spending and overcoming the budget deficit, I will try to implement tax reform and continue to modernize our armed forces; in the international arena, my main tasks are: conclude an agreement with the Soviet Union on significant arms reductions, improve relations with our Latin American neighbors without stopping the fight against the penetration of communism in Central America, and try to unwind the tangle ofcontradictions in the Middle East." And one more important point of R. Reagan: "I was in charge of general policy management, but I left the specific day-to-day workto specialists."

These are the main forms of manifestation of political power.

#### Technocratic legitimacy

Along with the traditional types of legitimacy of power (traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal), there is also such a type as technocratic legitimacy.

For the simple reason that politics deals with the interests and destinies of millions of people and the cost of mistakes in this area often takes the form of tragedies of entire nations, the question of the effectiveness of politics and politicians is particularly acute. Technocratic legitimacy is linked to this issue, the core of which is the requirement for the authorities **to be competent and professional**. It should be borne in mind that for those who exercise power or hope to achieve it, politics takes on the character of a craft, a specialized occupation, which necessarily implies the presence of special knowledge and experience. If this is not the case, then politics turns into politicking and loses its effectiveness. Very figuratively, the essence of technocratic legitimacy is expressed by Russian folk proverbs: "If you take up the wheel, do not say that you are not a dozen", "If you do not know the ford, do not stick your head in the water".